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W.H. Branson
L. T. Katseli
3/28/81
Currency Baskets and Real Effectiv e Exchange Rates
l.

Introduc tion and Summary.
With the major currenc ies continuo usly moving (if not floating freely)

against each other, a country that does not choose to float must decide
what to peg to.

If it pegs its currency to one of the major currenc ies,

it floats against the others.
all currenc ies.

If it pegs to the SDR it floats against

Thus in the system begun in the early 1970s the very

concept of a fixed exchange rate is unclear.
In this situatio n many countrie s have chosen to peg their currenc ies
to a basket, or a weighted average of other currenc ies.

This trend was

noted by Arthur Lewis in his Per Jacobsse n lecture at the IMF:
"It is now the convent ional wisdom that the currenc ies of
the develope d countrie s should float, but the currenc ies of
the less-dev eloped (LDCs) should not; that is to say that
each LDC should choose a more develope d country (MDC) as a
partner -- or the SDR -- and tie itself in a fixed
relation ship."

(Lewis, 1977, p. 33).

Since the SDR weights are not particu larly relevan t for any single
country , many countrie s compose their own basket.
General ized floating (or dirty floating ) raises problem s of
measure ment.

What is meant by "the" exchange rate in a floating ,

multiple -currenc y world?

The answer that has appeared in the literatu re

is an "effecti ve" exchange rate, which is generall y some trade-we ighted
index of changes in the home currency price of various foreign currenc ies.
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The IMF now publishes data on effective exchange rates.

These are based

on the IMF's multiple exchange rate model (MERM), described by Artus and
Rhomberg (1973).

It will be shown in this paper that this is only one

of a possible number of definitions for an "effective" exchange rate that
depends on the implicit choice of a target for exchange rate policy.
In an earlier paper [Branson-Katseli (B-K) (1981)) presented at a
conference in Stockholm in 1978, we derived weights for currency baskets
that would eliminate the effects of other countries' nominal exchange
rate fluctuations on various home-country policy targets.

There we

considered the problem of choosing a currency basket in the presence of
third-country exchange-rate fluctuations, holding prices constant.

In this

paper we extend that discussion in several ways.
First, in section 2, ~e focus our analysis on fluctuations in real
exchange rates and show that pegging to a currency basket is the same
as holding constant a real effective exchange rate that uses a specific
set of weights depending on the chosen policy target.

We also show that

the optimal weights of the earlier paper can be used for currency baskets
defined across real exchange rate fluctuations.

The underlying model of

trade prices and quantities is a partial-equilibrium model similar to
the one in B-K (1981) and is sununarized in Appendix 1.
The model of section 2 differs from others in the recent literature
in two respects.

First, a partial equilibrium approach is adopted as

opposed to the general equilibrium model of Flanders and Helpman (1979).
This affects the exact composition, but not the general form of the weights.

3.

Second, we derive weights that insulate policy targets from third-country
real exchange-rate fluctuations.

The alternative in the literature is to

adopt a variance-minimizing approach for a portfolio or a vector of targets.
Examples are Flanders and Helpman (1979), de Macedo(1979), and Lipschitz
and Sundararajan (1980).

They derive weights which differ from ours in

form, being functions of the variance-covariance structure of movements
in real exchange rates.
In sections 3 and 4 we discuss several ·problems involved in choosing
and computing optimal weights or the equivalent real effective rate.
In section 3 it is shown that the index formula itself aggregates countries
that are in a currency area, so that monetary authorities should use weights
based on trade with countries rather than on currency denomination of trade.
In section 4 optimal weights are combined with a crawling peg against the
basket.
Finally, in section 5 we report on an initial empirical investigation of pegging practices in Greece, Portugal, and Spain.

These are all

countries that have moved to basket pegs, with geographically diversified
trade.

We present initial estimates of the implicit weights in their baskets,

and find that all three count~iss experienced real appreciation relative to
the basket during the 1970s.

4.

2.

Real Effective Exchange Rates and Optimum Weighting Scheme~
The objective of this section is to extend our previous work

[Branson-Katseli (1981)] on the choice of weights for currenc~ baskets
and to develop further the theoretical framework for analyzing the cons
truction of and role of real effective exchange rates in the exercise of
exchange-rate policy.
It is easiest to begin with a definition of a real effective
exchange rate, and then go on to show how different currency basket weights
define alternative real effective rates.

Table 1 gives a complete listing

of the symbols that will be used throughout the paper.
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Table 1:

Symbols and Definitions

I= real effective exchange rate index of the home country.
i = index over N countries, i = 1, •• N. We study the 0th
country. The Nth country is the numeraire.

w

~

weights for O's basket peg.

T
1

a

units of O currency per unit of i currency.

1

Ji= units of numeraire ($) per unit of i currency.

r = units of O currency per unit of numeraire ($);Ti= Ji. r.
q

i

=

foreign country's cost index and foreign exchange ($) prices
of goods competing with 0th country exports and imports; for
simplicity it is assumed that qxi s ~i = qi.

Po= home country cost index and price of non-traded goods.
Z = dZ/Z,' for any variable

z.

e = exchange rate of O in the aggregate model of Appendix 1:
units of O currency per unit of foreign exchange; p = eq.
Px,Pm = home (0th) country prices of exports and imports.
X,M = export and import quantities of country zero.
ai,Bi= O's export and import shares from/to country i.
d

x'

s = price-elasticities of export demand and supply in O.
X
k = d /(d
X

X

- s ), an inverse index of export market power
X

of country O.
d ,s • price-elasticities of import demand and supply of country O.
m m
k' • s /(s
m

m

- d ), an inverse index of import market power of
m

country O.
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Movements in a real effective rate index for the home country
(country zero) are given by

=

I

(1)

rwi = 1 ,

where the weights wi remain to be chosen.

Noting that the bilateral

exchange rate of the home country O against country i (Ti) can be decomposed
into the home country price of an arbitrarily chosen numeraire, r, and the
.numeraire price of the currency 1, J , the numeraire can be factored out
1
of the index in (1) as follows. Substitute Jir for Ti, and add and
subtract qN to obtain

Since the weights sum to unity, the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the
numeraire can be factored out to give
A

(2)

I

a:

A

A

A

A

A

(r + qN - Po)+ ~wi (Ji+ qi - qN).

In equation (2) the first term represents the home-country real exchange
rate against the numeraire, and the second term is the weighted sum of the
numeraire's real rate against all other countries.
Now consider a policy rule that moves the nominal exchange rate
against the numeraire r to hold I constant:

(3)

7.

This policy rule both stabilizes the effective real exchange rate I
defined by wi and pegs the real rate in terms of the numeraire to the
currency basket across all N currencies (including the numeraire) defined
by the same weights w1 •

Thus if the home-country real exchange rate

vis-a-vis the numeraire is held equal to the basket real exchange rate
defined by a given set of weights wi, the real effective exchange rate
defined by those weights is held constant.
The weights wi in equation (3) can be chosen to insulate one of a
number of targets from movements in third-country exchange rates vis-a-vis
the numeraire.

Examples of such targets from B-K (1981) are (a) the

terms of trade px/pm, (b) the balance of payments pxX - pmM, and (c)
the price ratio of traded and non-traded goods. In principle, these optimal
Flanders

basket weights may be calculated for a variety of policy targets.

and Helpman (1979) and Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980), for example, derive
optimal basket weights for some of these as well as other policy targets.
The policy targets can, in turn, be expressed as combinations of
trade prices and quantities as shown in B-K (1981). In Appendix 1 changes
in trade prices and quantities are expressed as functions of movements in
A

A

(a) the home country's real exchange rate against the numeraire, r+ qN

A

-lb ,

and (b) the numeraire's real exchange rate against third countries,

. .

.

Ji+ qi+ qN.

These can be combined to give an expression for movements

in the chosen target variable which can in tum be set equal to zero to

solve for the weighting scheme wi that insulates that particular combination

8.

of trade prices and quantities from movements in third-country real
exchange rates.
Balance of Trade Weights.
If we index p

The balance of trade is given by BT= pXX - pmM.

X

and pm to unity initially, sopX = pm = 1, differentiation of this expression
for the trade balance yields

(4)

dBT

=

(p

X

+

X) X -

(p

m

"
+ M)

M

Substitution from equations

Here X and Mare the initial levels of trade.

.

A

A.10 - A.13 from Appendix (1) for px, pm' X, and M gives us the following
expression for the change in the trade balance, in home currency terms:

(5)

dBT

.
=

(X - M)

Po
"

.

"

+

[Xk(l + s ) - Mk' (1 + dm) ] (r + qN - Po)
X

+

Xk (1 + s) rai (Ji+ qi - qN)
X

"

A

A

N

...
Mk' (1 + d )
m

A

iei (Ji+ qi

"

qN) •

N

The first term is the effect of home price changes with a given initial
balance; the second term gives the effect of changes in the real exchange
rate against the numeraire; the term in brackets is the Marshall-Lerner

conditfon.

The last two terms give the effects of changes in third-country

real exchange rates on export and import values, respectively.
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To obtain the weights for the currency basket that would stabilize
the trade balance, we set dBT = 0 in (5), and solve for the real effective
exchange rate index:
(6)

with weights w. given by
1

Xk.(l+sx)ai - Mk'(l+dm)Bi
(7)

w

i

II:

Xk(l+s) - Mk'(l+d)
m
X

These are the same as the balance-of-trade weights (37) in B-K (1981),
and are essentially the same as the IMF's effective MERM weights.

If

initially X = M, the result of (6) for the real exchange rate against
the numeraire N is given by
= -

The nominal rate should be moved to make movements in the real rate equal
to movement in the weighted average of third-country real rates, with
weights given by (7).

These define a currency basket stabilizing the

balance of trade; they also define an effective rate I with reference
to stabilizing the trade balance.

10.
Terms-of -trade weights.
We could derive weights insulatin g the terms of trade p X /p m
from third-cou ntry real exchange rates from equations (A.10) and (A.12)
in ,t\ppendix 1.

However, given the balance-o f trade weights in (7),

we can proceed more directly.

Assume X = M initially , and eliminate

quantity effects from the balance-o f-trade weights by assuming
s X = dm

= 0.

Then those weights become the terms-of- trade weights
ko:.

1 -

(8)

k ' Si

These are the same as (28) in B-K (1981), and they define a currency bas
ket or effective rate that would stabilize the terms of trade.
in B-K (1981), in the small-cou ntry case where k = k

=

As noted

1, exchange -rate

policy cannot influence the terms of trade; weights (18) are relevant

'
only when k # k.
Weights stabilizin g the relative price of traded goods.
Equation

(7) gives weights for a currency basket aimed at stabi

lizing the trade balance.

These are essential ly defined as weights for

"the" effective exchange rate in the IMF literatur e.
Artus-Rho mberg (1973).

On

See, for example,

the other hand, as early as 1976, Stanley Black

derived weights aimed at stabilizi ng the relative price of traded vs non
traded goods.

These define an alternati ve effective exchange rate

oriented toward relative prices.

11.

In B-K (1981), the Black weights were shown to be the small-cou ntry
case of a more general scheme, as we now see.
Movements in the price of traded goods can be written as

where z X and zm are weights of exports and imports in total trade in
value terms, and z X + zm = 1.

...

Substitut ion from equations (A.10) and

...

(A.12) in · Appendix 1 for pX and pm yields
(10)

'
PT = Po + (z X k + zmk )(r + qN - Po)
+ z kfo.(J. + q.l. - q )
X

N

l.

l.

N
,.

+ z k ' !:B. (Ji + qi - q N·)
N i
Movements in the price of non-trade d goods are given b¥ domestic cost CQn
ditions, represent ed by p0 .

To hold pT/p

0

constant, we thus have the

s.olution

=-

(11)

with the weights w given by
i

'

(12)

wi

c::

zxkai + zmk Si
z_k_+--z~k-.,,,.,__
m
x

These are the same as B-K (1981), equation (32), and they provide an
effective exchange rate or currency basket stabilizi ng the relative price
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of traded vs non-traded goods as third-country real exchange rates
fluctuate.

In the small-country case, these simplify to total

trade weights:

These are Black's (1976) preferred weights.
The weighting expressions in equations (7), (8), and (12) give
alternative weights for currency baskets, or definitions of real effective
exchange rates, for alternative targets of exchange-rate policy. The
important points here are that,(a) as in our earlier work [B-K (1980,1981)),
each weighting system defines an effective exhcnage rate that corresponds
to a chosen target, but (b) the weights here,as opposed to the model in
B-K (1980, 1980),are used to define an index across real exchange rates.
Even though the analysis is a straightforward extension of the earlier model
it is an important extension in that it permits us to consider the cases of
PPP and of independent variations in prices and exchange rates as extreme
cases of one general framework.

Next we turn to some comments on the

appllcation of weighting schemes in the exercise of exchange-rate policy.
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3.

Issues in calcul ating optima l weigh ts.
The weigh ting scheme s of sectio n

2

use trade weigh ts ai and Bi ,

single
and they are aggreg ated to the point where each countr y has a
the same
import -comp eting price disturb ance qi and all countr ies have
elasti city of demand dX for one export good.

Two kinds of questi ons

s.
have been raised in consid ering how to apply any of these scheme
.
One is wheth er trade weigh ts or curren cy weigh ts are appro priate
second is how to disagg regate , in genera l across commo dities.

The

Two ex

or curren t
amples of the disagg regati on questi on are wheth er to use trade
of ex
accoun t weigh ts, and how to adjust for the commodity compo sition
In this sectio n

ports across , e.g., agricu lture, mining , manuf acturin g.
we will consid er these two kinds of questi ons in turn.
Trade shares vs curren cy shares .

in
Up to this point, we have noted the small- countr y specia l case
passin g.

alBut we have left for separa te discus sion a proble m that gener

ly appear s as one of two seemin gly differ ent questi ons.

These are as

denom inated
follow s: (1) How should trade weigh ts be modif ied if trade is
in a world curren cy?

For examp le, Zambi a's copper export s are stated in

sterli ng as determ ined on the London metal exchan ge.

(2)

Should we not

rather than
use shares of curren cy denom ination in the a 1 and Bi weigh ts,
semina r at
direct ion of trade? The first questi on was first raised at a
Colum bia Unive rsity, April 19, 1978.

The second was raised in Lipsc hitz (1979)

and the Monet ary
and again in discus sions at the Financ e Minis try in New Delhi,
that these questi ons
Autho rity of Singap ore, Januar y 9 and 28, 1980. Here we show
the smalln ess of thj
are essen tially the same, that t;hey are __reall y the questi on of
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countries, and that they are already answered in the formulation of the
real exchange rate in the weighting schemes of section 2.
Consider first the question of using currency area weights in
stead of trade weights in the calculations.

Suppose a subset Hof the

third countries denominate their trade with the home (zero) country in
dollars, as an example.

Then it seems intuitively plausible to argue

that those countries should be included in a "dollar area," and that
their weights.should be combined with that of the U.S. in calculations.
This is not quite correct, though.
The true importance of the fact (if, indeed, it is a fact) that a
country h prices its trade in dollars is the implicit assumption that
country h's prices move with U.S. prices, adjusted for the movements in
h's dollar exchange rate, Jh.
relative to the United States.

This is the assumption that his a small country
In this case the real exchange rate of h

...

vis-a-vis the U.S. is constant, and the term Jh + qh - qN in the weighting
calculations is zero.
The implications of this for the use of the weighting schemes can be
seen by concentrating again on the example of the export price index for
country zero from Appendix 1:

Suppose the U.S. dollar is chosen as numeraire, so N is the U.S.
sider first a case in which all other country's prices are independent

Con

15.
of the U.S.

Then a qN impulse will raise pxO by

N-1

= kqN + k r ai(-qN) =
1

The surmnation in the third term of (13) runs across all N countries.

Thus

,..

the q

N

impulse is entered with a weight of unity in the term giving the real

exchange rate of the home country against the numeraire, but it is taken out

N-1

with

3

rates.

r ai by the term giving movement in third-country real exchange·
1
Thus the weighting scheme itself gives a lone qN impulse a weight of

·wci~ht

Now consider a case in which some subset of H countries
(l, •• ,h, .. ,H) have prices that move with the dollar, so that for each of
these the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar is constant.

This is the

case in which the h countries are small relative to the U.S., and one
would wish to integrate them into a dollar currency area.

Now the effect

of a qN impulse on Pxo is given by

Thus the aggregation of countries that are truly in a currency area
in the sense that their real exchange rates are constant vis-a-vis each

16.
other is accomplished by the weighting index.

If countries price their

trade in the same currency, but their prices move independently, they

will not and should not be aggregated.

But if their prices·move together,

they automatically will be.
The problem of a country which is selling a commodity priced in a
numeraire on the world market is essentially the same.

If copper trades

at one world price, then all the relevant q.1 for a copper exporter will
move together, and be aggregated by the indexes into one world market.
At this level, the appropriate aggregation is again autonatically achieved by
the index.

The real problem for a commodity exporter will come with com

modity disaggregation within the importing countries.

This takes us to

the disaggregation question.
Levels of disaggregation.
While the indexes of equations (A.10) - (A.13) will perform the aggregation
of the world market for a single-commodity exporter, they do not take into account the probability that in each country i, the demand price for
the commodity moves somewhat independently of the average import-competing
price.

This example raises one.question of disaggregation.

The formulas

in equations (A.10) - (A.13), and the subsequent weighting schemes, treat
each country i as importing a single good with demand elasticity d.

To

X

implement the weighting schemes ideally, one would want to use for
qi

the internal demand prices in country i for the particular exports

and imports of the home country zero, and apply to them the appropriate
disaggregated elasticity and share parameters.

Thus for a country ex

porting only copper, one would ideally use movements in copper prices in
the various i countries, combined with estimates of elasticities relevant
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for copper, and the exporte r's trade shares.

This would then give the

correct index for that country 's p X , etc., and the proper calculat ion
of weights .
Another major example of the disaggre gation issue is the choice be
tween current account and trade shares for ai and Bi.

The e.ffectiv e

weightin g schemes of the IMF [see, for example Artus and Rhomberg (1973) ],
and the portfol io weights of Kouri and de Macedo (1978) and de Macedo
(1979) use current account shares.
In general , we would expect the services compone nts of the current
account

to have differen t elastic ities than the trade compone nt.

For

example , if migrant workers determin e the value of their remittan ces in
terms of foreign exchang e, k is effectiv ely unity.

If they fix the value
Thus ideally, the

in terms of their home currency , k is effectiv ely zero.

shares should be current account shares, and the elastic ities should be
averages of the trade and services compone nts.

Consiste ncy would suggest

not using trade elastic ities with current account shares.
The broad point here is that the formulas of section 2 are
highly aggrega ted, with elastic ities

implici tly given as weighted av

erages of the relevan t trade and services compone nts.

One can obtain a

first aggrega te approxim ation for the weightin g schemes by using trade
or current account shares oi and Bi and the correspo nding average elas
ticities .

But more precise calculat ion would require appropr iate dis

aggrega tion of both shares and elastic ities.

18.

4.

Adjustment of the real exchange rate and choice of optimal weights.

The optimal weighting schemes of section 2 give alternative sets of
weights for real exchange rates which have the following property: if the
home country real exchange rate vis-a-vis the numeraire follows the
path of the real basket rate, effects of third-count ry fluctuation s in
real rates will not affect the chosen target.

Thus if the nominal rate

r is manipulated to maintain

r +

qN -

Po

,.

= - l:w. (J.
N 1 1

+

"
qi. - qN)

with the appropriate ly-chosen weights wi, the target is insulated from
movements in real rates (J.1 + q.1 - qN) •
In the case of the balance-of- trade weights, this movement in the
real rate will maintain trade or current account balance, depending on
whether the wi include trade or current account weights.

On

the other

hand, the terms-of-tra de weights and the weights stabilizing the ratio
of prices of traded and non-traded goods (pT/p 0 ) will not in general
meet a balance-of-p ayments target.

If those weights are chosen, there

will still remain the need for adjustment of the real rate relative to
the basket to hold the balance of payments near its target.

One way to

achieve this adjustment would be to adopt a crawling basket peg such as

.. where Bis the balance on current account or overall payments, and R is
reserves.

This is the real-rate equivalent of the basket crawl

formula (4) in B-K (1981).
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The adjustmen t function Fin equation (14) gives the speed at which
the home-cou ntry real rate is adjusted relative to the basket real rate.
This is also the speed of adjustmen t of the real effective rate defined
by w1 .

The arguments of F ( • ) are the external- balance indicator s

used to adjust the real effective rate.

Obvious choices for these indi

cators would include flows such as the current-a ccount balance, or stocks
such as reserves relative to a target level.
Band R, respectiv ely, in (14J.

These are represent ed by

The optimal weighting of these indicator s

is analyzed in Branson-d e Macedo (1980).,
Since adjustmen t of the real effective rate, perhaps using a crawl
formula, can be used to maintain payments balance, it would seem sensible
not to choose the trade-bal ance weights for the currency basket.

One can

use, for example, the traded vs non-trade d goods (pT/p 0 ) weights to
eliminate variance in that ratio, and combine this with a basket crawl
to maintain payments balance.

This combinati on would, of course, give a

non-zero trend in the pT/p 0 ratio as the real rate vs the numeraire
moves relative to the basket, i.e., when F(•)fO. This would be the trend in
pT/p

0

needed to meet the external balance target chosen for the F adjust

ment function.

However the choice of weights (12) for pT/p 0 would reduce

the variance around that trend.
To summarize , adjustmen t of the real effective rate can be used to
maintain external balance.

This means that the weights for the currency

basket can be oriented toward a target other than the trade balance,
namely toward one of the relative- price targets.

Use of one of those

20.

weighting schemes will then stabilize the chosen target around the trend
dictated by the necessary adjustment of the real effective rate.

21.

5.

Application to exchange-rate experience in Southern Europe.
Three countries in Southern Europe, Greece, Portugal, and Spain,

have experimented with versions of basket pegs since exchange rates
began to float in the early 1970s.

In this section we briefly ex-

amine their experience, to see whether their choice of weights roughly
conforms to the analysis above.
their experience.

We begin with a brief description of

Next we discuss choice of targets for these countries,

and finally we examine the evidence.
Experience since 1971.
Following the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed parities,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain each sought to pursue a more flexible ex
change rate policy.

Given the fact that the ~jor currencies exhibited

substantial fluctuations vis-a-vis each other, pegging the exchange rate
to any single one of them meant substantial and continuous realignments
vis-a-vis the others.

Since all three countries have geographically

diversified trade (see Table 2 below), this implied that each would ex
perience analogous movements in the home-currency price of traded commod
ities if not of the terms of trade.
As early as the third quarter of 1971, Spain and Portugal abandoned

the dollar currency area and followed~he Deutsche mark (DM) in its upward
trend against the dollar.

This continued until the middle of 1975 when

both countries, hit by rising prices and appreciating effective real
exchange rates, started devaluing in nominal terms vis-a-vis both hard
currencies.

The escudo's devaluation against the dollar has continued

22.

since; the devaluation against the DM halted around the end of 1979.
The Spanish authorities, probably sensitive to the inflationary conse
quences of further nominal devaluations against as major a trading
partner as Germany, reversed that trend at the third quarter of 1977
and attempted to stabilize the rate around 36 Pesetas/DM.

This lasted

approximately until the end of 1979.
Greece followed the_.dollar in its downward movement vis-a-vis the
other hard currencies for a much longer period than either Spain or
Portugal.

The rate was held at 30 drachma/dollar until the middle of

1975 when a basket peg was adopted and the drachma started devaluing
vis-a-vis the basket.

It is only towards the end of the decade, with

rapid inflation of import prices and the CPI, that the rapid depreciation
vis-a-vis the European currencies was slowed.

This policy shift was also

prompted by increased trade prospects with the European Community (EC)
in light of the imminent entry into the EC, and the expected movement
towards harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policies.
The experience of the three countries during the 1970's can be thus
subdivided into three roughly comparable periods.

In the first period,

mid-1971 to mid-1975, Spain and Portugal maintained rough parities
vis-a-vis the Deutsche mark and appreciated substantially vis-a-vis the
dollar; in the case of Greece the opposite held true.

In the second per

iod which lasted to 1977 III in the case of Spain, and until the end of
1979 in the other two countries, all three countries experienced substan
tial effective nominal devaluations vis-a-vis all major trading partners.
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Since that time, monetary authorities have attempted to maintain rough
parities with the European currencies.
Choice of targets for the currency basket.
Currency baskets aimed at stabilizing three different policy targets
were discussed in section 2 above.

The targets are the trade balance,

the terms of trade, and the ratio of the price of traded goods to non-traded
goods pT/pN.

Which target would be most appropriate for Greece, Portugal,

and Spain?
In section 4, we argued that the effective real exchange rate can
be varied to meet a balance of trade target.

This implies movement of

the home-currency real rate against the numeraire relative to the basket
real rate, as illustrated in equation ( 14).

In Table 3 below, we see

that over the 1970s the effective real rate appreciated, on average, in
all three countries.

In Table 4, we see that at least in the cases of

Portugal and Spain, there is evidence that the effective real rate was
responsive to an external balance target.

Thus the choice of weights

for the currency basket itself comes down to terms-of-trade vs pT/pN
weights.
Exchange-rate policy can affect the terms of trade only in countries
I

with non-zero net market power; (k - k_) in equation (8) must be non-zero.

In Branson-Katsel i (1980) we estimated indexes of market power on the
export side and the import side for 101 countries.
pp. 62-67)].

Greece, Portugal, and Spain

have

[See B-K (1980,
relatively low values

of the market power index, suggesting that the small-country assumption
may be a good approximation in these cases.

Thus the terms-of~trade

weights in equation ( 8 ) are p.obably not appropriate.
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Oo--the other hand, there is evidence that in these countries exchange
rate fluctuation s do lllOVe pT/pN.

Equations explaining quarterly movements

in the cons~r price index (CPI) for several countries were estimated
in Katseli (1979).

These include movements in export prices and import

prices in dollars, and in the exchange rate as independent variables.

The

maximum estimated one-quarter elasticitie s of the CPI with respect to a
traded-good price are:

Greece, 0.26 (export price); Portugal, 0.37 (import

price); Spain, 0.09 (import price).

If these elasticitie s are close to the

shares of traded goods in the CPI, the implicit elasticity of the ratio

pT/pN

to

changes in PT is close to unity.

Given the smallness of these

countries, this means that a given change in the exchange rate moves pT/pN
more than it moves the terms of trade.

Thus the scanty evidence that is available suggests that the pT/pN
weights of equation (12) above would be most appropriate for Greece, Portu

gal, and Spain.

If we assume that the three countries are small, which

is consistent with the B-K (1980) calculation s, these weights reduce to
total trade weights, as noted at the end of section 2.
Evidence from Greece, Portugal, and Spain
Table 2 shows the direction of trade for the three countries in the
1970s.

In all three, the European Community (EC) is the largest trading

partner,wit h a share around 50 percent.

For Greece, Germany is the largest

among the EC countries, the UK dominates for Portugal, and Germany and
France come out about even in Spain.

The U.S. share varies from 5 percent

of Greek exports to 15 percent of Spanish imports.

are the a 1 and Si of the optimal weighting formulas.

The trade shares of Table 2

Table 2t

blrectlon of Trade
Perc::~nt11r.e of Country'11 T11tnl F.,cport!I (and Imports)

E

orts

I

orts

Spain

.rortur,a_~
[~rort!I

Greece

197J

Imports

1979

1975

1979

78.8 81.8

76. l

70,0

71.1

197) 197S

1979

197J 197S

1979

Industrial Cotmtrlesj 70.6

62.9

59.4

76.3

70.5

67.3

78.6

United Statee

6.5

5.1

5.5

8.3

7.4

4.8

9,8

7,2

6.0

8.2

Japan

1.2

1.6

1.1

1.0

8.3

9,5

1.7

0,9

1.1

4.J

EC(9)

S4.9

49.7

49.1

50.l

42.5 44.3

48.6

50.1 56.9

45.4

France

6.6

7.J

6.1

7.6

5.9

6.3

5.1

6.6 10.0

eer,..,n,

21.5

21.1

19.3

19.5

15.9

15.9

7.6

10.2 12.7

ttaly

9.S

8.3

9.8

9.1

8.2

9.3

J.2

United Klngdoa

7.1

4.9

S.2

S.6

4.8

S.7

3,l 12.6 14.7

6.7

17.3

12.5

Oll Exportln~
Countries
Non-Oll Developlnr.
Countries

Source:

16. l

14 .5

I

I■

oru

197)

1975 1979

10.2

63.2

62,l

70,4

60.4

~6.7

12.4 11.8

13.9

10,5

7.2

16.l

15.9

u.s

2.6

1.5

1.2

2.0

2.6

2.4

2.3

40.3 41.6

47.8

44.7

48.0

42.9

34.7

35.9

7.6

8.J

12.7

13.6 16.1

10.J

8.3

9.7

14.S

11.4

12.4

13.6 10.3

9.6

6.0

S.2

5.0

5.1

23. 7 21.2 18.1

11.8

8.7

9.1

1.6

3.2

10.8

10.7 11.7

I

0.6

15.2

I

19.7

14.1

ru
197J 1975 1979
Ex

197)

1975

3.3

1.9

16.6 13.9

6,9'.

J.4

11.7 10.7

10.J

5,3

J.4

6.5

6.0

5.1

5.6

8.0

7.6

7.2

6.3

S,3

S,1

6.2

10.5

10.9

ll,8

21.7

24.9

I 20.5

20.4

22.0

t5.3

13.6

15.5

n.o I

19.0 13,7 10.5

tHF, Direction of Tr~de Yearbook, 1980.
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In Tables3 and 4 we show the results of regressi on estimati on of
The depende nt variable

the weights in equation {14) in section 4 above.

is the quarterl y percenta ge change in the country 's real exchange rate
relative to the U.S. dollar, r + q us -

Po

The independ ent variable s

are the percenta ge changes in the real exchange rates of the dollar aA

gainst the other major currenc ies, Ji+ q.1 - q us (i#Vs)·' thus the signs
of the coeffici ents should be negative . The implici t U.S. weight is
one minus the absolute value of the sum of the estimate d weights for
i,fUS_; wus = 1 - rwi.

In Table 3 a constant term is included for the

average movement of the real effectiv e rate over the period; a negative
coeffic ient indicate s real appreci ation.

In Table 4 we add the level
A

and rate of change of net foreign assets, F and F, as indicato rs of
externa l balance.
In general , the equation s for Portuga l and Spain seem reasona ble;
those for Greece are more difficu lt to interpre t.

This is probably due to

the fact that Greece's currency basket was defined across nominal rather
than real exchange rates.

As has been shown in Katseli (1981), in the

case where the basket is defined across nominal rates, the estimate d weights
are roughly the same as those of Table 3 but the explana tory power of the
regressi on is markedly higher (R

2
m

.28).

In Table 3, all the constan ts are

negativ e, indicati ng real appreci ation relative to the basket.

In Table 4,

the level of net foreign assets has a signific ant negative coeffici ent for

...

Spain, and both F and F seem to play a role in Portuga l.
The patterns of coeffic ients giving currency weights permit us to draw
several tentativ e but interest ing conclusi ons:
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table 3 :

C

$

CPl\JG

$

Movements of Real Home-Currency Price
of the Doll arTe iativ e to Real Dolla r
Price of Selec ted Curre ncies
(Qua rterly Data 1970 II-19 80III
Perce ntage Change)

CPIJ

$

CPit,1:

irn • ffius V • crrus l · CPiFs"

$

CPt1 T

$

CPIFR

r · CPius 'ff · CPfus

$

CPISP

"f • CPiE

CJU:ECE

(.5)

-.228
(1.1)

-.002

-.204

-.003

( .4)

.071

(.5)

-.049
(. 3-).

(.4)

-.041

-.159

(.2)

(1.0)

-.132

(.5)

.082

WN = .580

.078 2.2

wN= .491

.073

(.3)
.105·

2.2

(.4)

10lTUCAL

I

CPIUS

T•c ffio

-.004

-.652

(.6)

(3.2)

-.004
(.6)

-.634
(3.2)

.057
(. 4)

.045
(. 3)
.051

(.3)

-.500
(1. 6)

.524
(1. 8)

.329
(1.2)

.348
(1. 3)

.007

WN = .279

.3£9 2.4

= .228

.367 2.3

(.O)

-.013

WN

(.1)

lli!!
P

T•

~.oo 9
CPtUS
'cffip" (1.7 )

-.161

-.053

-.043

(.9)

(.4)

(.3)

-.009
(1.8 )

-.179
(1.1)

-.049

(.3)

-.441
(1.8)

- .421
(1.8)

-.024

wN= .278

.320 1.8

(.1)
- .C42

(.2)

WN

= , 309

,317

L7

Table 4 :

-

.
C

Movements of Real Home-Currency Price of the Dollar Relathre to Basket

A

F

p·l

_J_ CPIWC $ CPIJ
DM CPIUS Y CPIUS

$ CPIUK _L CPUT _!_ CPIFR
CPIUS FF CPIUS FF CPIUS

~

$ CPISP
P CP1Uf. U.S. vN

R2

D-W

= .453

.15

1.98

.16

1.98

.44

2.4

.49

2.7

.34

1.7

.42

1.9

CREEC!
1)

CPIUS

l' • CPIGR

-.002
(.4)

.048

-.002 · .050 ~0001
(_. 7)

._(._O)

-.002

-.012

.004

-.118

(1.9)

(_. 3)

-.054

-.1'!.7

(.6)

(.O)

(.3)

-.111
(.2)

.022
(.2)

-.071

-. 775

(.2)

(.5)

-.705

.044

(1.6)

.358

WN

(1.1)

.374
(.5)

PORTUGAL
!

l .

CPIUS
CPIPO

(.3)

(1.6)

.001
(.1)

(LO)

-

SPAIN
p

CPIUS
$ • CPISP

-.009
'1.7)

•001
(.8)

(.5)

-.424
(1.4)

(.6)

.040
(.2)

(1.6)

-.056
(.4)

-.066
(.4)

-.462
(1.8)

-.002

-.040

-.500
"(2.1)

-.059

(.3)

:3. 3)

-.008 -.0002 -.671
(1.6)

-.002

-

(.4)

l

(.8)

.0003 -.0001 -.138
(.1)

(2.2)

.098

,3. 2)

-.162

, 3.2)

.093

.

-.179

(L 3)

(.J)

-.481

• 339
(1.2)

.341
(.1.5)

(..O}

-.079
(..4)

..

WN

= .252

-.099
(..5)

WN = .268

(.2)

Note
1.

In billions of home-curr ency units.

.

N
OJ
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1.

The estimated weights seem reasonable as a description of

actual experience.

They do not, however, correspond particularl y closely

even to our pT/pN weights.
2.

Over the whole period of the 1970s the weight of the dollar in

the basket was markedly higher in the case of Greece than in either
Portugal or Spain.

This is hard to ex~lain in terms of the Greek trade

shares (Table 2) but can be understood in light of the inertia of the
early period and preoccupati on of the Greek authorities with balance of
payments considerati ons.
3. The weight of the Deutsch~ma rk is highest in the case of
Portugal (.63).

Here again the explanation is probably historical rela

tionships and possibly a domestic inflation target.

Maintaining a re

latively stable rather than declining home-curren cy value of emigrant
remittances might also be an important aspect of that choice.
4. In all three cases the share of the Italian lira is quite high.
This probably reflects the preoccupati on with competitive export posi
tions in third markets.
5. For all countries there was a nominal devaluation and real
appreciatio n of their currency relative to the basket.

The nominal de

valuation was strongest in Portugal (8 percent on an annual basis) compared to Greece (approximat ely 4 percent) and Spain (less than one percent). [Katseli

(1981)].

On

the other hand, the real appreciatio n vis-a-vis the basket

was strongest in the case of Spain (around 4 percent).
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6.

Inclusio n of the current account balance and the level of foreign

assets as potenti al determin ants of the adjustme nt vis-a-v is the basket
seem to improve both the Spanish and Portugue se results.

This is esp

ecially true for the stock of foreign assets, which proves to be an im
portant determin ant of the authori ties' reaction to third-co untry exchange
rate movemen ts.

Inclusio n of these two variable s seems to make little

diffe~en ce in the case of Greece.
These results suggest a general pattern: confront ed with inflatio n
ary pressure s in the mid 1970's from both domestic and foreign origins ,
the monetar y authori ties in all three countrie s attempte d to safeguar d
their competi tive position interna tionally through a process of nominal
effectiv e devalua tions.

These policies produced only a relative ly small

real effectiv e exchange rate appreci ation in the face of domestic infla
tion rates which at least in Spain and Portuga l exceeded 20 percent by
1977.
Thus by the end of the 1970s these countrie s found themselv es caught
in the classic dilemma associat ed with exchang e-rate policy, namely the
conflic t between balance -of-trad e and domestic inflatio n targets.

The

econom etric evidence ,howeve r sparse, seems to suggest that in small open
economi es the effects of exchang e rate movements on the price ratio of
traded to non-trad ed goods is higher than the effect on the terms of
trade.

The experien ce of these countrie s in the 1970s and the switch in

policie s in the early 1980s seem to substan tiate that claim.
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A log-linear trade model with real exchanee rates.

Appendix 1:

In this section a simple partial-equilib rium model is developed that
provides the framework for the choice of weights for currency baskets or
effective exchange rates.

The model is essentially the same as that

developed in Branson-Katsel i (B-K, 1981), section IV.

There independence

of movements in exchange-rates and price levels was implicitly assumed.
Here the model is developed in terms of real exchange rates.

It is a log

linear supply-and-dema nd model for exports and imports which includes the
exchange rate as the translator-betw een home and foreign prices.

We begin

with the simple two-country version, and then disaggregate to many countries

and a numeraire.
Movements in aggregate trade prices and quantities.
Let us begin by concentrating on the export side.

Export supply prices

are assumed to be stated in home currency units pX , while foreign import
demand prices are given in foreign exchange units~-

The supply function

is written as
(A.l)

lnp

X

• lnp + s

-1
X

lnX.

Here pis a shift parameter representing the domestic cost of production
of exportables ands

X

is the price elasticity of export supply.

We assume

that pis also the home-currency cost of production of import substitutes
and non-tradeables .

Equation (AJ.) gives export supply X as a function

of the relative home-currency supply price pX /p.
giving the foreign currency price of exports is

The demand function
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lnq

(A.2)

X

• lnq + d

-1
X

lnX.

Here q is a shift paramet er represen ting the domestic cost of producti on
of import-c ompetin g goods in the foreign country, and export demand depends
Again, we assume that q is also the cost of

on the relative price qX /q.

producti on of exports in the foreign country.

For the analysis in a case

where domestic costs of producti on in the various sectors move differen tly,
The exchange rate e links px and~:

see B-K (1981).
(A.3)

P

X

•

eq •
X

··Subst itution of (A.,3) .into (A.2) for qX and total differen tiation yields
the expressi ons for percenta ge changes in export prices and quantiti es:
(A.4)

Px • k (e + q) + (1 - k)p,

(A.5)

X • ks

where k

X

= d X /(d X

(e

A

A

·A

A

+

q - p),
As noted in B-K (1980, 1981), k is

- s ) ; 0 < k < 1.
X

an index of market power on the export side.
d

X

-+ - •

In the small-co untry case

and k -+ 1.

The analogou s model on the import side yields the equation s for percentage changes in import prices and quantit ies:
p

m

(A. 7)

where k'

+

• k'(e
A

A

A

A

A

A

(A.6)

q)

+

(1 - k')p,

A

M • k'd (e + q - p),
m

= s m/(sm -

d )· 0 < k' < 1.
m '

Again, k' is an index of market

power on the import side; for a small country wher-e s m

-+ •

,

k'

-+

1.
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Disaggregation to many countries.
To disaggregate the model, we consider a world of N + 1 countries,

O, ••• ,N.

Country zero is the home country, whose exchange-rate policy we

are analyzing.

Country N is the numeraire, arbitrarily chosen.

Countries

j ( • l, ••• ,j, ••• ,N - 1) are the other (non-home, non-numeraire) countries

in the system.

The index i runs across all countries other than the home

country, including the numeraire, thus i • j, N.
The home-country price index pin equation (1) is now Po•

The import

competing price in country i's demand function is qmi' and the export
supply price of country i is qi.

The bilateral exchange rate of the home

country O against country i is Ti, in units of currency zero per unit of
currency i.

This can be decomposed into the home country price of the

numeraire r, and the numeraire price of the currency i, Ji:
(A.8)

For .exposition, we focus on disaggregation of movements in the export
price px ; disaggregation of x , pmO' and M follow easily by analogy.
0

0

0

With export weights given by ai, e and q in the px equation

(A.4) are the aggregates
N

e • Ia. (Ji + r) ;
1 l.

The disaggregated expression for pxO is now
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(A.9)

This is precisely the same as equation (24) in B-K (1981), with slight
changes in notation.
exchange rates.

The analysis there proceeded in terms of nominal

Here we wish to continue in terms of movements in real

exchange rates.
First, let us add and subtract the change in the numeraire's import
competing price qN in the second term of (A.9):

Now, remembering

that rai • 1, we can re-group the terms on the right

hand side into movements in real exchange rates:

(A.10)

The first term on the RHS of (A.10) is the change in the domestic (zero
country) export supply price due to changes in domestic cost conditions.
The second term is the change in the home-countr y real exchange rate against
the numeraire, using export prices.

The third term sums the change in the

numeraire's real exchange rate against all countries other than the home
country, including the numeraire (country N), again using demand prices
for exports of the zero country.
Several properties of (A.10) for pxO are worth noting:
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l.

If the home country is small, k •land p

0

drops out of

(A.10); Pxo depends only on world prices and exchange rates.
2.

An increase in the demand price qj in any one of the j (non
numeraire, non-home) countries clearly raise pxO by Pxo • kajqj,
proportional to j's share in home-country exports.

The increase

in qj also raises the numeraire's real exchange rate vis-a-vis j.
3.

An increase in the demand price in the numeraire country alone
raises Pxo by Pxo • kaNqN, symmetrically to all the other countries.
This results from the summation of the third term in (A.10) across
all i • l, ••• ,N.

Thus the formulation in (A.10) is completely

symmetric across all non-home countries, with the numeraire chosen
arbitrarily.
The disaggregation of the expressions for X, pm and M, and their state
ment in terms of real exchange rates, follow analogously to the develop
ment from equation (A.4) for px to (A.10) for pxo·

The disaggregated

version of (A.5) for the change in exports is

(A.11)

On the import side, e and qx in equations (A.6) and (A.7) disaggregate into
N

e •

re1<J1 +

1

-

N

qx

tBiqi,

1

~

r), and
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The disaggregated versions of

where Bi are import weights, and rei • 1.

(A.6) and (A.7) for pmO and M0 are then given by

(A.12)

A

A

A

A

A

A

MO• k'dm[(r + qN - Po)+ ISi(Ji + qi - qN)].

(A.13)

A

A

In (A.12) and (A.13), the term (r + qN - p0 ) is the change in the home
country's real exchange rate against the numeraire, and the term
A

A

A

·(Ji+ qi - qN)

is the real exchange rate of the numeraire against country i

(including the numeraire), using the prices relevant for country zero's
imports.
Equations (A.10) - (A.13) give the expressions for changes in export
and import prices and quantities in terms of movements in home prices and
real exchange rates.
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